Cryptocurrency Scam Geography Map: From Silicon Valley to Mumbai, Scams Know No Borders
Original Article Title: The Geography of Crypto Scams: Why No Region Is Innocent and Every User Deserves Better
Original Article Author: Mars_DeFi
Original Article Translation: Chopper, Foresight News
During the early days of cryptocurrency development, many believed that scams were the inevitable cost of innovation, and "rug pulls" or "exit scams" were limited to a few bad actors in the unregulated corners of the internet.
However, over the years, independent investigative journalists like ZachXBT have gradually uncovered a disturbing truth: cryptocurrency scams have long since become globalized.
Just between 2022 and 2025, ZachXBT documented 118 different types of financial fraud cases, ranging from multi-million dollar NFT rug pulls to intricate cross-chain money laundering networks. His investigative report revealed scam artists from all continents: from Memecoin projects endorsed by Silicon Valley influencers to Telegram scam syndicates in Mumbai, and pump-and-dump groups in Istanbul.
The consistency in the data presented is shocking: no country or region is immune to the exploits of scammers.
The Myth of Regional Scammers
A recent addition of a geolocation feature on the social platform X, intended to increase transparency, has sparked discussions related to xenophobic sentiments.
Many users have started attacking others based on the country of origin associated with their accounts, especially targeting accounts from India, Nigeria, and Russia, labelling the entire populations of these countries as "scammers."
However, ZachXBT's investigation tells a completely different story. Here is a brief summary of ZachXBT's investigation data from the past three years:
Out of the 118 verified scam cases:
· Approximately 41% originated from Asia (India, China, Southeast Asia)
· Approximately 28% originated from North America
· Approximately 15% originated from Europe
· Approximately 10% involved Africa
· Approximately 6% were untraceable due to mixing or privacy coins, maintaining anonymity
The regional distribution of scammers across these 118 reports is also noteworthy:

Regional Distribution of Cryptocurrency Scammers Identified by ZachXBT
The data reveals not a particular problematic region, but rather a global ethical lapse.
The above data exposes a key fact often overlooked in online discussions: despite Africans (especially Nigerians) being erroneously and unfairly labeled as cryptocurrency scammers, the reality is quite the opposite.
This indicates that cryptocurrency scams are not limited to a specific region but are a global issue transcending borders, languages, and cultures.
Examining Cryptocurrency Scams from a Macro Perspective

1) Country with the Highest Average Amount Stolen per Victim from January 2025 to June 2025
For those quick to blame Nigeria or India, the first graph is quite staggering. The top 10 countries where victims had the highest average amount stolen are:
· United Arab Emirates – Approximately $78,000
· United States – Approximately $77,000
· Chile – Approximately $52,000
· India – Approximately $51,000
· Lithuania – Approximately $38,000
· Japan – Approximately $26,000
· Iran – Approximately $25,000
· Israel – Approximately $12,000
· Norway – Approximately $12,000
· Germany – Approximately $11,000
Did you notice? Nigeria is not on this list at all, while the UAE, the US, several European countries, and many Asian countries are prominently featured.
If those stereotypes were true, Nigeria or India should be at the top of this list, but that is not the case.
2) Global Wallet Victims Map (2022-2025)
When we expand our view to the total number of global victims, the geographical distribution becomes clearer. Victims are spread across North America, South America, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, as well as Asia.
Regions with a higher number of victims include: Western and Eastern Europe, North America, parts of Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.
What about Africa? Compared to Europe, the Americas, and Asia, Africa has a much lower total number of victim wallets. This is not my subjective judgment but an objective fact presented by the map.
3) Regions with the Fastest Growth in Cryptocurrency Scam Victims (Year-on-Year 2024-2025)
The third image shows the regions where scams are growing most rapidly, with the year-on-year growth rate of victims in each region being:
· Eastern Europe - about 380%
· Middle East and North Africa - about 300%
· Central Asia / South Asia and Oceania - about 270%
· North America - about 230%
· Latin America - about 200%
· Asia Pacific - about 140%
· Europe (overall) - about 120%
· Sub-Saharan Africa - about 100%
Once again, Africa ranks lowest in terms of growth rate. Meanwhile:
· Europe and the Middle East and North Africa region lead globally in victim growth
· North America and Latin America follow closely
· The Asia Pacific region and the region where India is located are at a moderate level
· Africa is the least affected region in the entire dataset
If Nigeria is the global hub for scams, Africa will never be at the bottom of this list.
The truth is: Cryptocurrency fraud is not a Nigeria or India problem, but a global issue.
Data completely shatters the stereotype:
· The country with the highest amount stolen per victim is not in Africa or India
· The region with the fastest-growing scams is not in Africa or India
· Africa has the lowest year-over-year growth rate of victims
So, why are Nigerians and Indians unfairly labeled as “scammers”? Because people often judge based on emotions rather than evidence; because if a particular region has a viral scam, it becomes a collective label for 200 million people, and the spread of online bias is much faster than the truth.
According to the data:
· Nigeria is not one of the high-loss countries.
· Africa has the lowest increase in the number of fraud victims.
· Statistics in Europe and North America are worse.
· Asian regions like the UAE and India face highly valuable theft cases.
If an area has the most scammers, then the situation of victims in that area will also be severe (scammers will operate where they are familiar). But Africa and India do not exhibit this pattern at all.
If Nigerians and Indians were to generalize like others do, they could very well point fingers at Europe, the US, South America, the Middle East, and North Africa.
But they do not, because responsible people understand: scammers are everywhere — in every race, every region, every country; fraud victims are also global; no ethnic group should be labeled because of the actions of a few criminals.
ZachXBT's investigation also exposed scam behavior by American YouTube bloggers, European DeFi developers, and Asian marketing groups. Cryptocurrency fraud is not determined by nationality but is the result of unchecked anonymity, greed, and regulatory indifference.
How Can We Do Better?
For cryptocurrency to mature, it needs not only regulation but also collective ethical reshaping. This can be addressed in the following ways:
· Replace Nationality Bias with Transparency: Require project founders to undergo public audits, complete KYC, and disclose on-chain information, rather than making uninformed judgments based on nationality.
· Support Investigative Journalism: Investigators like ZachXBT and small detective communities have already helped prevent potential losses of millions of dollars. We should spread their work instead of nationalist noise.
· Always Stay Cautious: Until a project proves its reliability, consider every project a potential scam.
· Report Instead of Ridicule: When encountering suspicious accounts, use verification channels or reporting resources instead of spreading hate.
Summary
Cryptocurrency was born out of decentralized and libertarian ideals, but in the absence of accountability mechanisms, these ideals have been distorted into a global tool for exploitation. Scammers exist in every region, and so do victims. Let's stop the "on-chain xenophobia."
You may also like

TAO is Elon Musk, who invested in OpenAI, and Subnet is Sam Altman

The era of "mass coin distribution" on public chains comes to an end

Soaring 50 times, with an FDV exceeding 10 billion USD, why RaveDAO?

1 billion DOTs were minted out of thin air, but the hacker only made 230,000 dollars

After the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, when will the war end?

Before using Musk's "Western WeChat" X Chat, you need to understand these three questions
The X Chat will be available for download on the App Store this Friday. The media has already covered the feature list, including self-destructing messages, screenshot prevention, 481-person group chats, Grok integration, and registration without a phone number, positioning it as the "Western WeChat." However, there are three questions that have hardly been addressed in any reports.
There is a sentence on X's official help page that is still hanging there: "If malicious insiders or X itself cause encrypted conversations to be exposed through legal processes, both the sender and receiver will be completely unaware."
No. The difference lies in where the keys are stored.
In Signal's end-to-end encryption, the keys never leave your device. X, the court, or any external party does not hold your keys. Signal's servers have nothing to decrypt your messages; even if they were subpoenaed, they could only provide registration timestamps and last connection times, as evidenced by past subpoena records.
X Chat uses the Juicebox protocol. This solution divides the key into three parts, each stored on three servers operated by X. When recovering the key with a PIN code, the system retrieves these three shards from X's servers and recombines them. No matter how complex the PIN code is, X is the actual custodian of the key, not the user.
This is the technical background of the "help page sentence": because the key is on X's servers, X has the ability to respond to legal processes without the user's knowledge. Signal does not have this capability, not because of policy, but because it simply does not have the key.
The following illustration compares the security mechanisms of Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram, and X Chat along six dimensions. X Chat is the only one of the four where the platform holds the key and the only one without Forward Secrecy.
The significance of Forward Secrecy is that even if a key is compromised at a certain point in time, historical messages cannot be decrypted because each message has a unique key. Signal's Double Ratchet protocol automatically updates the key after each message, a mechanism lacking in X Chat.
After analyzing the X Chat architecture in June 2025, Johns Hopkins University cryptology professor Matthew Green commented, "If we judge XChat as an end-to-end encryption scheme, this seems like a pretty game-over type of vulnerability." He later added, "I would not trust this any more than I trust current unencrypted DMs."
From a September 2025 TechCrunch report to being live in April 2026, this architecture saw no changes.
In a February 9, 2026 tweet, Musk pledged to undergo rigorous security tests of X Chat before its launch on X Chat and to open source all the code.
As of the April 17 launch date, no independent third-party audit has been completed, there is no official code repository on GitHub, the App Store's privacy label reveals X Chat collects five or more categories of data including location, contact info, and search history, directly contradicting the marketing claim of "No Ads, No Trackers."
Not continuous monitoring, but a clear access point.
For every message on X Chat, users can long-press and select "Ask Grok." When this button is clicked, the message is delivered to Grok in plaintext, transitioning from encrypted to unencrypted at this stage.
This design is not a vulnerability but a feature. However, X Chat's privacy policy does not state whether this plaintext data will be used for Grok's model training or if Grok will store this conversation content. By actively clicking "Ask Grok," users are voluntarily removing the encryption protection of that message.
There is also a structural issue: How quickly will this button shift from an "optional feature" to a "default habit"? The higher the quality of Grok's replies, the more frequently users will rely on it, leading to an increase in the proportion of messages flowing out of encryption protection. The actual encryption strength of X Chat, in the long run, depends not only on the design of the Juicebox protocol but also on the frequency of user clicks on "Ask Grok."
X Chat's initial release only supports iOS, with the Android version simply stating "coming soon" without a timeline.
In the global smartphone market, Android holds about 73%, while iOS holds about 27% (IDC/Statista, 2025). Of WhatsApp's 3.14 billion monthly active users, 73% are on Android (according to Demand Sage). In India, WhatsApp covers 854 million users, with over 95% Android penetration. In Brazil, there are 148 million users, with 81% on Android, and in Indonesia, there are 112 million users, with 87% on Android.
WhatsApp's dominance in the global communication market is built on Android. Signal, with a monthly active user base of around 85 million, also relies mainly on privacy-conscious users in Android-dominant countries.
X Chat circumvented this battlefield, with two possible interpretations. One is technical debt; X Chat is built with Rust, and achieving cross-platform support is not easy, so prioritizing iOS may be an engineering constraint. The other is a strategic choice; with iOS holding a market share of nearly 55% in the U.S., X's core user base being in the U.S., prioritizing iOS means focusing on their core user base rather than engaging in direct competition with Android-dominated emerging markets and WhatsApp.
These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive, leading to the same result: X Chat's debut saw it willingly forfeit 73% of the global smartphone user base.
This matter has been described by some: X Chat, along with X Money and Grok, forms a trifecta creating a closed-loop data system parallel to the existing infrastructure, similar in concept to the WeChat ecosystem. This assessment is not new, but with X Chat's launch, it's worth revisiting the schematic.
X Chat generates communication metadata, including information on who is talking to whom, for how long, and how frequently. This data flows into X's identity system. Part of the message content goes through the Ask Grok feature and enters Grok's processing chain. Financial transactions are handled by X Money: external public testing was completed in March, opening to the public in April, enabling fiat peer-to-peer transfers via Visa Direct. A senior Fireblocks executive confirmed plans for cryptocurrency payments to go live by the end of the year, holding money transmitter licenses in over 40 U.S. states currently.
Every WeChat feature operates within China's regulatory framework. Musk's system operates within Western regulatory frameworks, but he also serves as the head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). This is not a WeChat replica; it is a reenactment of the same logic under different political conditions.
The difference is that WeChat has never explicitly claimed to be "end-to-end encrypted" on its main interface, whereas X Chat does. "End-to-end encryption" in user perception means that no one, not even the platform, can see your messages. X Chat's architectural design does not meet this user expectation, but it uses this term.
X Chat consolidates the three data lines of "who this person is, who they are talking to, and where their money comes from and goes to" in one company's hands.
The help page sentence has never been just technical instructions.

Parse Noise's newly launched Beta version, how to "on-chain" this heat?

Is Lobster a Thing of the Past? Unpacking the Hermes Agent Tools that Supercharge Your Throughput to 100x

Declare War on AI? The Doomsday Narrative Behind Ultraman's Residence in Flames

Crypto VCs Are Dead? The Market Extinction Cycle Has Begun

Claude's Journey to Foolishness in Diagrams: The Cost of Thriftiness, or How API Bill Increased 100-Fold

Edge Land Regress: A Rehash Around Maritime Power, Energy, and the Dollar

Arthur Hayes Latest Interview: How Should Retail Investors Navigate the Iran Conflict?

Just now, Sam Altman was attacked again, this time by gunfire

Straits Blockade, Stablecoin Recap | Rewire News Morning Edition

From High Expectations to Controversial Turnaround, Genius Airdrop Triggers Community Backlash

The Xiaomi electric vehicle factory in Beijing's Daxing district has become the new Jerusalem for the American elite

Lean Harness, Fat Skill: The Real Source of 100x AI Productivity
TAO is Elon Musk, who invested in OpenAI, and Subnet is Sam Altman
The era of "mass coin distribution" on public chains comes to an end
Soaring 50 times, with an FDV exceeding 10 billion USD, why RaveDAO?
1 billion DOTs were minted out of thin air, but the hacker only made 230,000 dollars
After the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, when will the war end?
Before using Musk's "Western WeChat" X Chat, you need to understand these three questions
The X Chat will be available for download on the App Store this Friday. The media has already covered the feature list, including self-destructing messages, screenshot prevention, 481-person group chats, Grok integration, and registration without a phone number, positioning it as the "Western WeChat." However, there are three questions that have hardly been addressed in any reports.
There is a sentence on X's official help page that is still hanging there: "If malicious insiders or X itself cause encrypted conversations to be exposed through legal processes, both the sender and receiver will be completely unaware."
No. The difference lies in where the keys are stored.
In Signal's end-to-end encryption, the keys never leave your device. X, the court, or any external party does not hold your keys. Signal's servers have nothing to decrypt your messages; even if they were subpoenaed, they could only provide registration timestamps and last connection times, as evidenced by past subpoena records.
X Chat uses the Juicebox protocol. This solution divides the key into three parts, each stored on three servers operated by X. When recovering the key with a PIN code, the system retrieves these three shards from X's servers and recombines them. No matter how complex the PIN code is, X is the actual custodian of the key, not the user.
This is the technical background of the "help page sentence": because the key is on X's servers, X has the ability to respond to legal processes without the user's knowledge. Signal does not have this capability, not because of policy, but because it simply does not have the key.
The following illustration compares the security mechanisms of Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram, and X Chat along six dimensions. X Chat is the only one of the four where the platform holds the key and the only one without Forward Secrecy.
The significance of Forward Secrecy is that even if a key is compromised at a certain point in time, historical messages cannot be decrypted because each message has a unique key. Signal's Double Ratchet protocol automatically updates the key after each message, a mechanism lacking in X Chat.
After analyzing the X Chat architecture in June 2025, Johns Hopkins University cryptology professor Matthew Green commented, "If we judge XChat as an end-to-end encryption scheme, this seems like a pretty game-over type of vulnerability." He later added, "I would not trust this any more than I trust current unencrypted DMs."
From a September 2025 TechCrunch report to being live in April 2026, this architecture saw no changes.
In a February 9, 2026 tweet, Musk pledged to undergo rigorous security tests of X Chat before its launch on X Chat and to open source all the code.
As of the April 17 launch date, no independent third-party audit has been completed, there is no official code repository on GitHub, the App Store's privacy label reveals X Chat collects five or more categories of data including location, contact info, and search history, directly contradicting the marketing claim of "No Ads, No Trackers."
Not continuous monitoring, but a clear access point.
For every message on X Chat, users can long-press and select "Ask Grok." When this button is clicked, the message is delivered to Grok in plaintext, transitioning from encrypted to unencrypted at this stage.
This design is not a vulnerability but a feature. However, X Chat's privacy policy does not state whether this plaintext data will be used for Grok's model training or if Grok will store this conversation content. By actively clicking "Ask Grok," users are voluntarily removing the encryption protection of that message.
There is also a structural issue: How quickly will this button shift from an "optional feature" to a "default habit"? The higher the quality of Grok's replies, the more frequently users will rely on it, leading to an increase in the proportion of messages flowing out of encryption protection. The actual encryption strength of X Chat, in the long run, depends not only on the design of the Juicebox protocol but also on the frequency of user clicks on "Ask Grok."
X Chat's initial release only supports iOS, with the Android version simply stating "coming soon" without a timeline.
In the global smartphone market, Android holds about 73%, while iOS holds about 27% (IDC/Statista, 2025). Of WhatsApp's 3.14 billion monthly active users, 73% are on Android (according to Demand Sage). In India, WhatsApp covers 854 million users, with over 95% Android penetration. In Brazil, there are 148 million users, with 81% on Android, and in Indonesia, there are 112 million users, with 87% on Android.
WhatsApp's dominance in the global communication market is built on Android. Signal, with a monthly active user base of around 85 million, also relies mainly on privacy-conscious users in Android-dominant countries.
X Chat circumvented this battlefield, with two possible interpretations. One is technical debt; X Chat is built with Rust, and achieving cross-platform support is not easy, so prioritizing iOS may be an engineering constraint. The other is a strategic choice; with iOS holding a market share of nearly 55% in the U.S., X's core user base being in the U.S., prioritizing iOS means focusing on their core user base rather than engaging in direct competition with Android-dominated emerging markets and WhatsApp.
These two interpretations are not mutually exclusive, leading to the same result: X Chat's debut saw it willingly forfeit 73% of the global smartphone user base.
This matter has been described by some: X Chat, along with X Money and Grok, forms a trifecta creating a closed-loop data system parallel to the existing infrastructure, similar in concept to the WeChat ecosystem. This assessment is not new, but with X Chat's launch, it's worth revisiting the schematic.
X Chat generates communication metadata, including information on who is talking to whom, for how long, and how frequently. This data flows into X's identity system. Part of the message content goes through the Ask Grok feature and enters Grok's processing chain. Financial transactions are handled by X Money: external public testing was completed in March, opening to the public in April, enabling fiat peer-to-peer transfers via Visa Direct. A senior Fireblocks executive confirmed plans for cryptocurrency payments to go live by the end of the year, holding money transmitter licenses in over 40 U.S. states currently.
Every WeChat feature operates within China's regulatory framework. Musk's system operates within Western regulatory frameworks, but he also serves as the head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). This is not a WeChat replica; it is a reenactment of the same logic under different political conditions.
The difference is that WeChat has never explicitly claimed to be "end-to-end encrypted" on its main interface, whereas X Chat does. "End-to-end encryption" in user perception means that no one, not even the platform, can see your messages. X Chat's architectural design does not meet this user expectation, but it uses this term.
X Chat consolidates the three data lines of "who this person is, who they are talking to, and where their money comes from and goes to" in one company's hands.
The help page sentence has never been just technical instructions.
